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Distributed database technology is a comparatively
recent development within the overall database field. The
greatest advantages of distributed database systems are:
Efficiency of local processing for most operations.
Data sharing between different computers (nodes) in
the distributed system.
However, inherent in the distributed database system are
the basic problems of a centralized database (e.g., security,
concurrency control and integrity). These problems are more
critical in the distributed database environment due to
several factors such as the large domain of users, the
multitude of interactions possible between programs of
heterogenous computers, and the multiple copies of a database
in the different sites.
Preserving the integrity of a distributed database is not
an easy task, particularly when all or part of the database is
replicated at different nodes. An update of such a database
is subject to a number of problems concerned with coordinating
a series of updates entered at different sites and insuring cor-
rect entry of updates into all copies of the database. Reliable
communication between such nodes is vital so that no entry or





This thesis discusses the problem of database integrity
from a broad perspective. Such a problem needs a clear view
for understanding the means and causes which threaten
distributed database integrity. Approaches for resolving
this problem are examined with respect to data classes,
database configurations and systems applications.
This thesis is divided into two main parts. Part one
consists of the introduction and the nature of the problem.
It sets the scene by explaining the nature of the problem and
gives a background for aspects related to distributed database
integrity. These aspects define the scope of such integrity
and serve as a terminology reference for the following
chapters. Chapter III, Distributed Database Integrity Threats,
is a brief study of some of the major factors which threaten
data integrity. These include hardware and software
malfunction, operational and user errors, and communications
failures
.
Part two consists of Chapter IV which contains a detailed
discussion of the different methods and approaches which have
been proposed for maintaining the integrity of distributed
database systems. These include: design considerations,
management considerations, operations strategies and
communication strategies. This part ends with Chapter V
which contains conclusions reached by the author.
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II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A prerequisite to solving a problem is a clear under-
standing of the problem itself; the integrity of distributed
database is no exception. This section will present a
background and some of the characteristics of this problem.
A. BACKGROUND
1. Preliminary Definitions
Database can be defined as a collection of inter-
related data items that are processed by one or more
applications programs. These programs which control the
data contained in the database are called a Database Manage-
ment System (DBMS) [Ref . 1] . This system is composed of
several internal functional areas, e.g., a record management,
a lock scheduling and recovery control, allocation of data to
transaction, and insurance of data sharing and recovery over
the database. A Distributed Database Management System (DDBMS)
is a collection of sets of data in a network. Each site in
the network is a computer running a local DBMS. The network
consists of two or more nodes, interconnected with a computer-
to-computer communication system. Another important term is
the Database Administrator (DBA). This refers to the person
(or group of people ) responsible for overall control of the
database system, using a number of utility programs to help
with database control. Examples of utility programs include
13

loading routines, data dictionary and recovery routines.
Users interact with DDBMS by entering transactions (from
different sites); this means a program or on-line query
which accesses the database.
2 . Transactions
a. Types of Transactions
A request to a DBMS or DDBMS system can take
any one of the following forms:
(1) An inquiry . This type of request does not
update the directory; or, the database processing is required
in order to access the directory and the database. An
example is read only.
(2) An update . This type of request changes
the status of the database but does not necessarily require
that the directory contents be modified. Processing is
required for accessing the directory, possibly changing the
contents of the. directory, and for changing the contents of the
database. Examples of this type include read, write, change,
delete, and file manipulation.
The first type of request is the simplest
form because it does not imply any change in database status;
the other types include changes in the status of the database.
b. Transaction Handling Methods
The way a DBMS or DDBMS handles any type of
transaction depends on the characteristics of the distributed
system. Davenport [Ref. 2] defined some ways of handling
transactions by a distributed database system:
14

(1) Application job chaining . The transaction
is split into a number of components with each component
executing application programs and accessing data within a
database section within the confines of a single computing
facility (node). When one component finishes, it passes
intermediate results to and activates the next component in
a remote computing facility. When all components have
completed, the final results are transmitted back to the
computing facility where execution of the first component
took place. Those results are passed back to the terminal
that originated the transaction. Application job chaining
can be summarised as moving the process to the data.
(2) Transparent access . The transaction
executes application programs within one computing facility
but accesses data within database sections which are held
on remote computing facilities. Transparent access can be
summarised as moving the data to the process. The rate of
change in database depends on the classes of data.
3. Classes of Data
A DDBMS is concerned with the types of data
(residing in each node). One criteria for differentiating
between data is the update mode. Different types of data
have different types of updating. There are five classes
of data [Ref . 31
•
a. Class 1: Unchanging Data
This is data which is never or only infrequently
changed, e.g., town names and streets; historical information
15

b. Class 2: Simple Update Data
This is data which is updated by simple replace-
ment, such data which is performed twice with no harm done,
or data which is upgraded by adding new and separate records,
e.g., airline timetables; price lists.
c. Class 3- Nonrepeatable Independent Update Data
This is data with an update which cannot be
applied twice, but which is independent of any other update.
The update can take place at any time (within limits), e.g.,
bank account balances.
d. Class 4: Time-Critical Update Data
If this type of update is reapplied at different
times (e.g., after a restart), its effect may not be the same
Its effect is tied to other events or to other updates which
occur independently, e.g., airline reservations.
e. Class 5' An Action Triggered Update
When this data is updated it may trigger the
updating of different data or other actions in a different
machine, e.g., an inventory balance with automatic recording
done on a different machine if the balance falls below a
certain level.
A DDBMS is concerned about transaction types,
transaction methods, and classes of data. It is also




4. Distributed Database Systems CDDBS )
A distributed database (DDB) can be implemented by
storing some subset of the entities that make up the database




The formula is a distributed implementation of database where
E denotes the set of entities stored at Site S; DB is the
s '
set of all entities that make up the database.
There are many ways in which the entities that comprise
the database may be divided among the various sites . They
can be characterized as follows
:
a. Fully Redundant DDB
Every entitiy is stored at every site. See
Figure la on page 18.
b. Partially Redundant DDB
Some entities are stored at more than one site.
See Figure lb on page 19.
c. Partitioned DDB.
No entity is stored at more than one site. See
Figure lc on page 20.
Each type of organization has its advantages, depending on
the nature of the database and its use.



































Certain areas of the background have little or no
concern with integrity problems. These would include Class 1
in Classes of Data, and an inquiry (read only) transaction
in partitioned DDB. Other areas are within the integrity
scope.
B. SCOPE OP DISTRIBUTED DATABASE INTEGRITY
The scope of data integrity can be as wide and as com-
plex as the database system is designed in order to protect
its status. It can range from enforcing a simple semantic
constraint on data entry to the use of sophisticated
hardware (e.g., database machines), software, and automatic
recovery techniques. Techniques also include communication
strategies and concurrent control mechanisms.
The range of the scope is based on the class of the data,
the type and method of transactions, and the configuration
of data distribution.
There are many points of view in defining data integrity.
From a DBMS viewpoint, integrity could be defined as the
ability of DBMS to preserve the status of the data elements
2in the database from any threats leading it to an inconsis-
tent state. The generality of this view includes other
related terms, e.g., consistency of database. Maintaining
There are different types of semantic constraints.
Generally, it can be defined as an arrangement of values
beyond which the input data should not go.
2
Discussion of the types of threats is in Chapter III
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the integrity of the database can be viewed as protecting
the data against invalid alteration or destruction.
Integrity is thus distinct from security, although the
two issues are closely allied. Indeed the same mechanism
may be used to achieve the preservation of both, at least to
some extent. Reference 5 presents examples for such
mechanisms. In discussing the integrity of distributed data-
bases it is helpful to divide the previous view of data
integrity into the global view and the local view. The
first view is concerned with the integrity of the whole
system (global); the second view is concerned with the
integrity of the system in the site (node) level (local).
In this thesis the assumption of the approach is the global
DDBMS with heterogeneous or homogeneous local DDBMS.
22

III. DISTRIBUTED DATABASE INTEGRITY THREATS
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the threats
which are likely to affect consistency of database. These
threats could change information, destroy the whole database
or a subset, or give an inaccurate state of the database.
Studying these threats and their origins assists the
designer in planning for countermeasures to decrease the
probability of threats occuring, or to decrease the impact
of the threat should it occur. Such study needs to be taken
in a general view so that the developed solutions will be
easy to adopt for various systems in different situations.
Some solutions have been proposed [Ref . 6 and Ref . 7]
.
However, they focus on a very limited area of the whole
problem or are limited to a special type of database.
This chapter will examine the distributed database threats
in order to see which is most and least critical for data
integrity. Chapter IV will discuss different practical tech-
niques which can be used to maintain the distributed database
integrity. The importance of these techniques varies from
one DDBMS to another according to its application.
DDBS integrity is threatened by several factors including:
Hardware malfunction. This can result in failure of
protection activities, disabling the memory read/write protec-




Software errors. DDBMS application programs may
contain undetermined errors which will arise over a period
of time. These errors could also come from OS or utility
programs %
Operational problems. These happen during the
transaction handling and data manipulation. For example,
concurrency conflicts can induce improper sequences of
operations and lead to inconsistencies.
Communication failures* These result from abnormal
conditions in the distributed environment and may lead to
site crashes. A site crash in any node may prevent the
completion of database updating in other nodes.
User errors. These result from human interaction
with the system, e.g., user update errors or a bad entry
which introduces inconsistent data elements.
Other indirect errors may contribute to the DDBS threats.
These include physical security of the computer system and
the quality of DP management. Other than management and
human errors, the DDBMS is responsible for realizing these
problems and for ensuring the suitable strategy for resolving
them. The remainder of this chapter will describe and analyze
the above problems.
A. HARDWARE MALFUNCTION
Hardware failures can cause unintentional relevation,
destruction, or scrambling of data elements in the database.
24

These failures can result from device deficiencies or from
worn out parts. The limitation of using conventional
computer architecture for database application increases
the possibility of failures. Current computers are well-
suited to scientific and traditional business applications.
However, they are not well-suited to information storage and
retrieval. Information storage and retrieval applications
require addressing by content; while conventional computers
are designed for referencing by physical address [Ref . 8]
.
This mismatch between conventional computer architecture and
application requirements for information retrieval introduces
inefficiencies in both the processor and storage areas. Data
access tends to become computer-bound and tables required to
locate data can consume more storage than the data itself.
B. SOFTWARE MALFUNCTION
The difference between intended and actual behavior is
caused by "bugs" (program errors). Most large software
systems are error-prone; these errors are supposed to be
corrected during debugging. However, debugging is often
considered a problem for three reasons: (1) the process
is costly (takes too much effort); (2) after debugging the
software still suffers from bugs; and (3) when the software
is later modified, bugs turn up in completely unexpected
places. Software faults account for approximately 20 percent
of all failures. An analysis of software errors and their
25

causes is discussed thoroughly by Endres [Ref . 9] and by
Schneidewind and Hoffman [Ref. 10]
.
Failures may be introduced into software at any stage of
its development. These may include the following:
1. During Specification
The analyst may omit to specify what a program should
do under certain circumstances. The program may either do




The processing algorithms chosen to do a particular
job may be wrong in that they fail to reflect real life.
3. In Implementation
Through carelessness, misunderstanding, or lack of
testing the program may not code what is required.
4 In Maintenance
This is the most critical stage because while
enhancing the program or correcting new faults, new faults
may be introduced as unexpected side effects.
Errors in any level of DDBMS software or in the lower
layers of software systems could change the status of
database to an inconsistent state. The difficulty here is
that all of this can take place without notifying DDBMS.
Types of real-time software errors are given in Appendix A.
According to Lorin [Ref. 11] , the software layers which





Inconsistency in a database may occur temporarily as an
inevitable consequence of an operation on the database.
For example, if a data element is moved from membership of
one set to another, there will be a brief period when it is
attached to both or to neither. Conflict may occur in
concurrent access to distributed database such as two users
both attempting to modify the same data element.
Each modification of an entity (or data element) creates
a new version of that entity. There exist two types of
concurrency conflicts which can appear when actions simultan-
eously create new versions:
1. Lost Operation
This occurs when the new version of an entity is
created by a transaction which utilizes obsolete versions
of entities to produce the new one.
2. Inconsistency
Inconsistency appears when an integrity constraint
is violated.
Simultaneous executions of transactions must be scheduled
in order to prevent lost operations and inconsistency.
D. COMMUNICATION FAILURES
If each node in the distributed system network has a
(direct/indirect) path to every other node (partitioned),
communication link failures do not create any difficulty
27

since the partition which has a majority of nodes in the
network can still continue operating and treats the nodes
in the other partitions the same as if in crashed sites.
This is a special case if only one partition is allowed to
operate; but generally inconsistency among databases in
different partitions may occur.
It is necessary to guarantee transaction atomicity in
order to be sure that either all the transactions updates are
committed in all the sites, or none of the updates are
committed. For this purpose, some approaches have been
proposed, e.g., two-step commitment protocol [Ref. 12].
Such approaches depend heavily on reliable communication
between nodes (sites).
Communication link failures and site crashes are
fundamental problems in distributed processing and local
networking.
E. USER ERRORS
There are different types of errors in user-computer
interface. This difference comes from several factors such
as error revising, error origin, or unethical access. The
degree of destruction in data is dependent on the type of
data class. The actual causes of the error may come from
unspecialized user or unintentional entry (bad entry). The
upgrading in the degree of access authorization in distribu-
ted database environment tends to be less strict in the
28

ordinary database if there is conflict between the global
and local access authorized administrations.
To prevent such errors it is desirable that tools be
supplied to DDBMS in order to detect, investigate, and




IV. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF DISTRIBUTED DATABASE
Distributed database systems pose problems of integrity
much greater than those of centralized database systems, due
to the multitude of interactions betwen different application
programs, from heterogeneous nodes and concurrent updating
the distributed database.
These programs must be prevented from interfering with
one another. In addition, when updates occur in one site of
the redundant DDB, this update should be read directly to the
other copies in order to prevent inconsistency of database.
Also, in the absence of effective communication, a crash site
in one of the local databases may prevent the continuity of
distributed database operations. Crash site or communication
link failures need to be handled in such a fashion that
gracefully degraded service is permitted. Moreover, the
problems of long transmission delay and narrow bandwidth of
most communications networks exists in distributed systems.
There is considerable research containing reasonable
solutions to some general problems of database systems; for
example: database integrity, concurrency control and recovery
techniques. Such approaches frequently work poorly in a
Due to the internal system delays that result from
secondary storage, main memory and GPU characteristics [Ref.131
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distributed environment because of the significant differences
in hardware and software configuration.
Maintaining the integrity of DDB is not an easy task.
In order to reach such an objective, careful, revised
planning for this should start from the early stage of imple-
mentation of the distributed system through the system
maintenance stage. Of course there is a limit to the extent
to which this objective can be reached; in particular, human
mistakes. Apart from limitations of this or a similar
nature, however, it should be possible to maintain a high
degree of integrity in distributed database by implementing
integrated planning.
This chapter contains some considerations and strategies
which need to be taken in account in planning for the integrity
of distributed database.
A. DESIGN CONSIDERATION
In designing distributed database, integrity issues
should be the prime objective. The following factors need
to be considered in order to achieve the first stage of the
objective:
An efficient hardware: special machines to suit
database applications (database computer).
The mistakes that can be made by the human operator
include errors such as using the wrong versions of programs
or damaging data volumes by careless handling.
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An effective network communication: to handle the
data distribution gracefully.
Reliable software: to cope with abnormal situations,
over which the software designer has little or no
control.
1. Efficient Hardware
In Chapter II it was seen that the limitation of
using conventional computer architecture for database appli-
cation is one of the hardware malfunction causes which
threaten the integrity of database. There are different
approaches to computer architectures which are more efficient
for information storage and retrieval applications, specifi-
cally in database computers,
a. Database Computer
The database computer can be incorporated into
a system in one of four ways [Ref . 14]
:
Back-end processor for a host.
Intelligent peripheral control unit.
Storage hierarchy.
Network node.
Each of these approaches is independent and a system may
include more than one of the architectures in its list.
Each will be considered separately.
The back-end processor approach is usually
though of as a master-slave configuration where the host
passes high level access requests to the back-end. The
32

back-end is a general purpose computer which performs all
of the database activities including access validation,
storage management, update lockout, response formatting, and
I/O operations. When the back-end processor has completed
the access, it passes the response back to the host. The
communication link between the host and back-end is usually
an I/O channel, but it may be a telecommunication link.
The back-end processor can provide several
benefits to the local database. Hardware specialization is
possible, for example, leading to more efficient data and
interrupt handling on a dedicated basis. Long register
lengths, high speed floating, point, double-precision,
multiplication and division hardware can be omitted.
Furthermore, software specialization can reduce the overhead
in handling interrupts and task switching.
The intelligent peripheral control unit approach
moves out the highly repetitive aspects of data access to a
mass storage controller in order to avoid the high overhead
of the general purpose host hardware and software. The
basic functions of device scheduling, head positioning, data
recovery, searching, sorting, and error correction are
implemented at this level. In addition to the usual I/O
function, sequential associative access can also be implemented
because of the close coupling between the intelligent control
unit and the mass storage device. If the mass storage device
is a disk, parallel read may be implemented to obtain storage
33

search speeds. The mass storage can also be a charge-
coupled device (CCD) storage or bubble storage depending on
the size and speed required. The controller is connected to
the general purpose host through the normal I/O channel.
The storage hierarchy approach is a specialized
architecture which can make database operations more
efficient. The essence of this approach is that the same
characteristic which makes a cache attractive for main
storage access can also be used to improve access to mass
storage. A wide variety of applications exhibit considerable
locality of data reference. This is true of data reference
by a processor to main storage for many applications, and
has been exploited in the form of a cache, or high speed
buffer. When the processor needs a word from main storage,
the request is first made to the cache. If the desired word
is in the cache the access is completed typically in 50 to
150 nsec. If the request is made to main storage it is
typically completed in 800 nsec. A database cache is inserted
in the system between main storage and disk.
The network node approach is a general purpose
computer which communicates with several other nodes in the
system; most frequently using data communication protocol
and serial channels, but possibly using I/O channels. The
benefit of this configuration is that several nodes (hosts)
can access a single shared database. The network node can
be implemented using a general purpose system only (which is
34

current practice), a general purpose host with a back-end
processor, or a general purpose host with an intelligent
control unit.
b. Integrity of DDB in Database Computers
From the viewpoint of integrity, the back-end
processor approach is more beneficial than the other approaches
Using the back-end approach will improve the database integrity
at local level. The back-end provides a single path to the
database. This eliminates "back door" paths to the data
through use of the same mass storage subsystem for both the
database and normal system files. Application programmers
can be prevented from programming the back-end computer and
thus possibly introduce "sneak" access paths. Integrity
at the local level is also improved by a single access path
because locks on updates can be strictly enforced.
Site recovery can presumably be improved because
a failure in the host computer will not compromise the data-
base. Also, presumably the back-end computer has much less
hardware and much simpler software than the host, thus
extending the time between system failures. The host and
back-end can check on each other's sanity, including keeping
separate audit trails.
However, there are trade-offs in this approach.
The second processor and the software will add cost and
complexity in initial development and in maintenance. Two
hardware systems and two software systems must be maintained,
35

thus increasing training and support costs. The reliability
of the system will be degraded because having a second
system will increase the failure rate which will threaten the
integrity of data in case of partitioned DDB. In the other
types of distributed database systems this failure has less
threat (in cases of partially redundant DDB), or no threat
(in cases of fully redundant DDB), since the entities are
stored at more than one site.
Another advantage for the back-end processor,
which is relevant to DDB, is the ability of this processor
to decouple the database from the host to ease conversion
or interface multiple heterogeneous hosts.
2. Effective Communication Systems
The communication system describes the way in which
the links and nodes of a computer network are connected.
Because no specific definition of the precise composition
of computer networks exists, several methods of characteri-
zation can be used. One characterization involves the
reasons for which a network is used. This includes computer
resource sharing, database sharing, program sharing and
program segmentation. The geometrical arrangement of
system resources could be viewed from two points of view:




Network concepts can be classified according to how
they contribute to the design of a distributed system or
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distributed database. The manner in which work is partitioned
in a computer network essentially determines how effectively
the resources of the network are utilized.
a. Computer Network Message Techniques
In a computer network the techniques for routing
messages from source to destination are generally classified
as circuit switching, message switching, and packet switching.
Through one or more of these techniques many computer networks
provide packet switching capability and virtual circuits. A
computer network performs a set of well-defined functions,
uses a set of network components, and adheres to a collection
of rules and protocols. A protocol is a set of conventions
between communication nodes that governs the procedures and




Network management is the process which determines
through what facilities a message will travel from its source
to its destination. It is also concerned with the management
of network resources—communication links, switching nodes,




The two types will be discussed separately.
The master-slave network management refers to
the use of one or more master stations or processors that
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control a plurality of slave processors or nodes. The routing
of a particular message is directly controlled by the slave
processors, but the general management is controlled by the
master station or processor.
Distributed network management refers to the use
of decision making facilities at each node (processor) with
no one node given control over another node. Depending upon
the type of network and the number of nodes, data communication
networks are typically designed using one of these two types
of network management systems.
Some of the issues that must be considered in
determining the type of network management system for a given
application are:
Hardware and software availability.
Reconfigurability and flexibility,
Susceptibility to communication failures.
Prom the above issues, it can be pointed out that master-
slave systems are much more structured and accountable,
more available, in more widespread use, and often more
flexible than distributed configurations. Distributed
networks are more reconfigurable and may offer less suscep-
tibility to communication failures
.
Network and communication components which are
part of the distributed system include the basic components
of the database system, the schema, the data, and the
programs. A distributed database system therefore should
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be designed around two sets of objectives: database objectives
and communications objectives. The database objectives are
availability and integrity. Communication objectives involve
the reduction of number and size of messages and the path
length between network nodes (effectiveness). The objectives
can be satisfied through the following alternatives:
Splitting the database.
Splitting the directories.
Locating the database programs.
Distributed database system characteristics are achieved
through various combinations of the above alternatives with
any strategy of data distribution (fully redundant, partially
redundant, partitioned).
c. Integrity of DDB in Computer Networks
There are many possible mechanisms which can be
used to make the network computer function efficiently.
These machanisms may reside in any of the distributed system
locations. There are three basic types of control mechanisms
that may be implemented in computer networks to support the
integrity in DDB and to protect against error in access control,
memory control, and integrity control.
(1) Access control . This refers to techniques
for preventing unauthorized access to the computer network,
application programs, memory, or operating systems. Control
procedures can be added to this control to recover from
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errors or failures and to ensure that no messages are lost or
double processed.
(2) Memory control . This refers to techniques
for setting predetermined criteria such as who can read or
write what from database or memory. In effect, memory
control is access control, not for just the system, but for
specific areas of memory. Specialized techniques such as
internal usage codes or memory encipherment may be implemented
to deter an unauthorized penetration or produce inconsistent
data should a detected penetration occur.
(3) Integrity control . This refers to techniques
for determining the integrity of the computer network. That
is, that it is operating as it was intended to operate. At
the most basic level, all system operations
—
jobs, application
programs, supporting systems, communications, and so forth
—
are given security codes and checks to ascertain whether such
operations are occurring when they should be. More
sophisticated mechanisms include internal auditing mechanisms
and fail-secure and graceful degradation systems.
3. Software Reliability
Although many efforts to improve software quality
and reliability have been made, it is hard to say if they
will completely eliminate software failures. In the Bell
Laboratory Electronic Switching Systems (which employ
hardware redundancy and thoroughly tested software) soft-
ware accounted for approximately 20$ of all failures [Ref. 16]
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Continuous software modification for large systems
leads to additional failures. In many database applications
such as computerized air-line reservations systems, isolated
small breakdowns can be tolerated as long as the overall
system remains operational. However in another application,
traffic control systems for example, only moments of cessation
of service can be tolerated; incorrect results are unacceptable.
There are two basic concepts that make up reliability of
software.
a. Correctness
A program is correct if it performs properly




A program is robust if it will continue to do
something reasonable in the presence of environmental
changes (such as hardware failure) and demands (such as
bad data) that were not foreseen. In addition to robustness,
the terms fault-tolerant and error-resistant are often used
to describe this property.
The need for reliability of operations in large
automated real-time systems is becoming increasingly important,
particularly in transportation applications and nuclear
industry [Ref. 17]. For such systems it is important to
have high confidence that the system will behave as expected
for all possible environments. Software structures must be
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investigated which provide fault tolerance in addition to
fault avoidance. Correctness is a more narrow concept since
it refers only to the operation of a system with respect to
conditions that can be laid down in advance.
Robustness is concerned with making programs well-
behaved in the face of unexpected events, so that it can cope
with such situations. Coping means finding alternative ways
of carrying out required functions, even though something is
wrong. It may mean notifying a higher authority that
something is wrong. It almost always means not propagating
the error so that problems are contained and catastrophies
do not occur. It may mean finding some way to recover from
the malfunction.
Figure 2 illustrates the various steps of fault
tolerance. A detailed discussion of these steps and the .
different techniques for fault tolerance is available in
Reference 18.
(1) Error detection . The first step is to
recognize or prevent system failures by designing proper
checks for every critical step. A detected error is only a
symptom of the fault that caused it and does not necessarily
identify that fault. Usually there is many-to-many mapping
between errors and possible reasons.
(2) Hardware reconfiguration . At this step
a different strategy will be to ignore the fault and try to
















STEPS OF FAULT-TOLERANT PROCESSING
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Reconfiguration necessarily involves some degree of perfor-
mance and/or function degradation.
(3) Recovery . Once the system goes into an
erroneous state, its resources (program states, databases)
should be brought to a correct state before further
processing can be continued. Forward or backward error
recovery techniques are used.
(4) Software Reconfiguration . A different
strategy in this step could be used. In the distributed
software environment, a higher authority or the central
module can be notified to take an action, i.e., isolating
the software portion which contains the error (locking the
site where the error originated).
4. Reliable Software and DDB Integrity
a. Distributed Software
Reliable software should support the data
distribution in distributed systems. There are a number of
functions required to be handled in a distributed database
system. Ideally, there would be only one integrated piece
of software. However, the most likely method of development,
because of the amount of effort required, is that additional
software will be written to interface to the standard
components supplied by the manufacturer or software vendor
in order to handle the distributed database aspect. The
standard components would be the same for either a single
computing facility or distributed system. These include:
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Control structure or network component
(additional component).
Therefore, reliable measures should be applied for all the
pieces of distributed software,
b. DDB Integrity
One way to ensure that incorrect data is not
stored in the database is by defining integrity assertions
on the distributed structure and semantics of database, and
surrounding the local databases with an integrity monitor.
Any access to the database would pass through the integrity
monitor for verification. Transactions violating the
assertions would be disallowed. There are three issues
reported in Reference 18 regarding this approach for
ensuring integrity of the distributed database:
Design of integrity assertions.
Language of the integrity assertions.
Monitoring of integrity assertions.
(1) Integrity assertions . There are two types
of integrity assertions that can be defined at the local
database
:
(a) Structural constraints. For example,
we can declare that duplicate keys or records are not allowed
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Every table must contain only those items which are fully
dependent on the attributes. No transitive dependencies
among attributes are allowed.
(b) The actual values. These values of the
constant are stored in the database. For example, we can
limit the value of an item to be within reasonable bounds.
(2) Language of integrity . The language used to
express integrity assertion could be the same as one used for
accessing the data. DDBMS should enable the local DBMS's to
define their assertion. (See [B. 1] ) DBMS can use tables
(such as header to data file) to describe integrity assertion.
These tables are brought at the time of access of these files.
It is important that DDBMS (in the case of partitioned DDB)
maintain a global table which would contain the whole local
table.
(3) Monitoring of integrity . The monitoring or
validation of integrity assertions can be done before executing
the transaction at run time, or after executing the transaction
Each DBMS should monitor the assertions for the data residing
in its local node. The three methods are briefly described
below:
(a) Pre-execution. This method requires:
(i) Simulating the transaction to
find results that would be written if assertions are not
violated (what is to be written?).
(ii) Checking the assertions.
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(iii) Executing the transaction if
all the assertions were found true.
(b) Run-time validation. This method
requires: (i) Executing a transaction,
ignoring its "write" operations.
(ii) Checking the assertions,
(iii) Performing the "write" operations
if all assertions are found true.
(c) Post-execution validation. This
method requires
:
(i) Executing transactions completely.
(ii) Checking the assertions.
(iii) Performing corrective actions.
Which of the above methods is best? This
will depend on the types of transactions that will be entered
in the database system. If we have the list of items for
read and the list of items for write, the pre-execution
validation cost is less than or equal to the run time
validation cost, which is less than or equal to the post-
execution validation cost,
c . Summary
Understanding the importance of the reliability
issues for the DDB in the early stage of planning can help
the system designers to build software that will be fault-
tolerant and which will lead to robust processing. It will






The increase in size and complexity of database
systems (i.e., Distributed Database over hererogenous hosts)
requires the decentralization of some database functions to
avoid performance bottlenecks and to improve accessibility
without losing integrity of the data. One form of decen-
tralization is delegation; just as the general administration
of an enterprise is delegated in an hierarchical way which
can be easily decomposed into autonomous functional units.
a. Authorization Functions
Decentralization of authorization functions in
distributed database means that authorization functions,
instead of being in the hands of DDBMS, are distributed to
local DBMS' s of the system. The DDBMS may wish to retain a
separate administrative function in order to better control
the database or delegate some of the administrative rights
(i.e., the right to grant access to a particular class of
database) to a local DBMS.
b. Decentralized Authorization Model
A model for decentralized authorization for
partitioned database has been proposed by Wood S. Fernandez
(Appendix B). This model is independent of database con-
figuration (centralized or distributed). It can be adapted,
after slight modification, for non-redundant DDB. Each node
needs to have a replicated class-node directory (which
typically will be small compared with the number of
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authorization rules). Validation of an administrative or
access request requires the reading of the directory to locate
the node where the relevant authorization rules are stored
and passing the request to the DMBS if the rule corresponding
to the request is denied. Rules at other DBMS ' s need not be
searched. The delegation of a class requires access to
authorization rules at possibly two DBMS' s. Recall of a
delegated class requires access to the rules stored at the
nodes associated with the classes in the class structure
subgraph. However, recall is not likely to be a frequent
occurrence. Authorization related functions can therefore
be performed with the minimum of inter-node messages.
c. DDB Integrity and Decentralized Authorization
In the proposed model there are no multiple
delegations of specific administrative rights, e.g., it is
not possible to give to one DBMS the right to define authori-
zation rules for the objects in a class, and to another DBMS
the right to define integrity constraints for these objects.
However, delegation of specific administrative rights
(access rights, types of access, and integrity constraints)
to the local DBMS will improve the accessibility control to
the database and support the overall integrity of database.
In the case of partitioned database, it is helpful to
distribute the integrity responsibilities among the DBMS's
A class may be a set of relations
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so that every DBMS will be responsible for maintaining the
integrity of the portion of the database which resides in
its local node.
2. Data Independence
Data independence is a capability of a DBMS that
insulates a program from interference with its use of data.
Technically, this means that the way in which the data is
organized in secondary storage and the way in which it is
accessed are both dictated by the requirements of the
application. For example, it may be decided that a particular
file is to be stored in indexed sequential form. The appli-
cation, then, must know that the index exists and must know
the file sequence (as defined by the index) . The internal
structure of the application will be built around this
knowledge
.
Data independence is the additional function that
preserves alternative views of the same stored data during
evolution of the data environment. The importance of data
independence is to reduce the effect of the application
change on the statues of database. There are two types of
data independence: static and dynamic [Ref. 191
•
a. Static Data Independence
Static data independence is the ability to cope
with change in the "everyone out of the pool" mode. All
processing of that body of stored data is stopped. All the
descriptions are rewritten. All the stored data is converted
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(possibly automatically) to correspond to the new descriptions
All the application programs that access the stored date are
converted (possibly automatically) to correspond to the new
descriptions. When this conversion is complete for the entire
database, then processing can resume. For the heterogenous
nodes configuration, it may be possible that each local
database will conduct the above separately,
b. Dynamic Data Independence
Dynamic data independence is the ability to cope
with change when there are not two states (the pre-existing
and the target), nor the ability to suspend processing
during the conversion. Dynamic change can be characterized
as the concurrent existence of different forms of represen-
tation: organization, indexing, access paths, materialization
algorithms for the same kind of data. An example of dynamic
change is the distributed database in real-time system often
cannot be taken down while the stored data is reconfigured
and reorganized.
DDBMS or DBMS dynamically provides the data to
the user or the user's program as it expects to see the data.
Therefore, the stored data need not be completely converted.
The programs need not be recompiled for the processing of the
stored data to proceed.
Dynamic variation therefore has two aspects:
(1) the existence of different extents of the same kind of
stored data with different sets of descriptors, and (2) the
51

possibility of "rolling conversion" concurrent with proces-
sing. In the first case, the mixture of different formats
may coexist for an extended period of time. All of the old
stored records remain in the earlier format, and all the new
stored records conform to the new format. In the second case,
the conversion mechanism shares the database with concurrent
applications. Applications can utilize stored data subject
to time-variable descriptors, with the system insulating
them from the time variability.
c. Impact of Data Independence on DDB Integrity
Different applications (originating from
different nodes) will need different views of the same data.
For example, suppose that before the enterprise introduces
its integrated database, we have two applications (from two
nodes), AN1 and AN2 , each owning a file containing the label
"Part#." Suppose, however, that application AN1 records
this value in decimals while application AN2 records it in
binary numerics. It will still be possible to integrate the
two files and to eliminate the redundancy (saving the updat-
ing process for one copy), provided that DDBMS performs all
necessary conversions between the stored representation
which is chosen (which may be decimal, binary, or something
else again)
.
DBMS will have the freedom (at the local level)
to change the storage structure or access strategy or both
in response to changing requirements, without having to
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modify existing applications. If applications are data-
dependent such changes involve corresponding changes to
programs. This leads to unpredictable errors, especially
for large systems such as distributed database systems.
It follows that the provision of data indepen-
dence should be a major consideration in managing the data-
base system. Such consideration may take an important role




1. User Error Detection and Avoidance
At least two types of user errors exist which can
threaten the database consistency:
User programs can be incorrectly programmed.
User programs input data can be incorrect
.
Errors from the first type are generally detected at debugging
time. However, it is obvious that some of them remain.
Therefore, DBMS should prevent incorrect database updating
due to incorrect programming. Errors from the second type
usually happen when end users who are performing data entry
are not specialized persons . To prevent such errors , the
user program should verify the input data as completely as
possible. However, it is not possible to avoid some typing
errors, such as 3,000 in place of 3,200 for a salary. Even
if all verifications are not possible, it is desirable that
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tools be supplied in order to detect and correct or avoid
user errors. Such tools could be intelligent terminals.
a. User Error Detection
The semantic integrity is a method utilized to
detect user error by enforcing integrity constraints. These
constraints are defined by the DBA and are verified by DBMS
whenever the database is modified. At the end of a trans-
action, all integrity constraints should remain satisfied.
However, some of them can be verified after performing a
database update. That is the case for integrity constraints
where only one data item or an individual record is involved.
All other integrity constraints are checked at transaction
end, before committing updates. For this purpose, the data-
base which would be obtained with the transaction updates
is considered and integrity constraints are evaluated. If
one of them is false, the transaction updates are cancelled
and the transaction is rolled back. It is not necessary to
examine all integrity constraints, but only those whose
value (true or false) could be modified by the transaction
updates. Generally such integrity constraint verifications
are very expensive and user error detection by integrity
constraint monitoring appears as an inefficient mechanism.
b. User Error Avoidance
There are some efficient semantic integrity
verification methodologies which have been proposed by Hammer
[Ref.20] and Gardarin [Ref. 21]. In these approaches, semantic
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integrity is maintained at compilation time rather than at
execution time. Therefore, one can say that user error is
avoided.
(1) The first approach . This is based on an
analysis of operations performed by a transaction at compila-
tion time. The integrity constraints studied are restricted
to those constraining an individual object. Consider a pair
of operation-integrity constraints: an assertion processor
performs an analysis that produces an efficient test for
the assertion under the operation. This process begins with
perturbation analysis. This determines the effect that
execution of the operation can have on the truth of the
assertion. The information thus derived permits determina-
tion of a set of conditions under which the assertion can
remain true after executing the operation. If the conditions
are suspicious, then the assertion processor generates an
efficiency test that will be performed at the time the
operation will be invoked, and which will determine the
assertion value. Moreover, whenever possible, the generated
test can be evaluated before executing the operation, thus
allowing the avoidance and execution and rollback of the
operation. In addition, several equivalent tests can be
generated. The test that should actually be used by the
database system at run-time is the one that is expected to
incur the lowest cost in its execution. Finally, this
approach allows user error avoidance by perturbation analysis
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at compilation time and prompt, efficient test evaluation at
run-time, but only for restricted classes of integrity
constraints
.
(2) The second approach . This has been proposed
by Gard and is based on program correctness. Transactions
are written in PASCAL-like programming language. A data
manipulation language based on predicate calculus is embedded
in the programming language. An axiomatic definition of both
PASCAL and the embedded data manipulation language is
utilized in order to show that integrity constraints are
constraints through the statements of the transaction with
the Hoare axiomatic and predicate calculus theory. The
formal proof of success requires inclusion by hand of
correct tests in the transaction program. Finally, an
automatic transaction consistency verifier is proposed which
will definitely permit avoidance of inconsistencies induced
by incorrect programming and/or incorrect data entry.
However, to build such a transaction consistency verifier
remains a difficult program proving task.
2. Recovery Techniques
Recovery is the process of repairing the faulty
system or component, or putting right any damage it may have
caused, and of restoring it to normal operation.
a. Recovery elements




(1) Database Dump. A periodic copy of the
database is made.
(2) Logs (Journals). These are serial files
which provide a continuous historical record of all the
transactions of a certain type.
(3) Database Log. This contains two types of
entry. First, before image , is a copy of the old, unchanged
version of any block of database. Second, after image , is
a copy of the new version of any block of database.
(4) Log Control Data. This allows a check to
be made as to whether or not the log block was correctly
written.
(5) Checkpoint. This is a stable point
written on the log. In the event of recovery action being
required, a search for incomplete transactions need only
take place between the most recent check point and the end
of the log file.
b. Distributed Database Recovery
There are different methods of recovery for the
distributed database. Each method depends on the particular
recovery points. The recovery situation of the recovery
points may be of two types: transaction recovery points
which lie either on transaction or integrity unit boundaries,
and system recovery points which are check points [Ref. 22].
The methods of recovery are briefly described in Appendix C.
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Recovery can be employed in updating in two types of DDBS
.
These are as follows:
(1) Update of Partitioned Data . Transactions
may cause amendments to any part of the database when they
are processed. The restart and recovery actions performed
depend much more on the transaction handling methods."
(a) Application Job Chaining. When
application job chaining is the method of transaction handling,
an important consideration is the scope of the integrity
2
unit.- This is used in order to maintain content consistency
as to how much of the database a transaction must have sole
access to. If any integrity unit is required to span several
nodes, then resources are blocked for a significant period
of time. The aim should be to confine integrity units to
within nodes. Therefore each node maintains its own logs of
transactions and database changes. If a particular node has
suffered a failure, then recovery is initiated. The method
of recovery will depend on the type of failure. If the
recording media has been damaged, then roll-forward,
There are two types of updating: delayed update and
immediate update. Our concern here is the latter, since the
immediate update is critical for the integrity issue.
p
Integrity unit: A component of database architecture




roll-forward with roll-back or re-run is employed. If a
transaction or database request has aborted, then roll-back
is employed since the system is a distributed one. The
status of the transaction is of interest to more than one
node. Therefore, when recovery is initiated, messages
indicating that fact should be passed back to the local
nodes.
(b) Transparent access. With transparent
access an integrity unit may span several nodes. A trans-
action in one node may require a section of database that
is not in the local storage. The central or hierarchical
control will grant the requests using mechanisms which
insure the consistency of database. Each node should have
a log that contains transactions and changes in database.
If there is failure in recording media at a particular node,
then the local database is recovered using roll-forward,
roll-forward with roll-back, or re-run. If the failure is in
the transaction then roll-back method is used. The messages
between nodes depend on the type of the control. If the node
issues a request for data which is not in the local database,
the request is sent to the control and the node waits for
the reply. If a failure occurs during the request processing
(at the other node) then the reply may take an unacceptable
length of time. Thus it is necessary to monitor control
messages which receive a response that indicates that
recovery is taking place (in the node holding the required
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data). The receiving node should roll-back the transaction
and the monitoring control should send a message to the
original node to reinput the transaction at a later time
when the original node has received a control message
indicating that recovery has been completed.
(2) Update of redundant data . In this type of
DDBS, update should take place on all copies which are
redundant within short interval times using the transparent
access as the handling method. This method is a viable
solution for the problem of maintaining the integrity of
DDBS if most of the transactions are from read only types
with a small number of transactions from file manipulation
types. The recovery at this type of update is the same as
for update of a partitioned database. There is an extra
degree of complexity due to requests for data being made
simultaneously to several nodes. In case of failure in
one node, two actions should be taken. First, the transaction
being executed has to be rolled-back. Second , the database
may have to be rolled-back in a number of nodes. Therefore,
control messages will have to be passed to each node and be
rolled-back.
3 . Concurrency Control Mechanisms
In database environments, there are multiple users
and programs which access a database concurrently. These
require a concurrency control. The problem is to synchronize
concurrent interactions so that each reads consistent data
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from the database, writes consistent data, and is ultimately
processed to completion [Ref. 23]. In a distributed database
this problem is exacerbated because a concurrency control
mechanism at one site cannot instantaneously know about
interactions at other sites. Before discussion of the con-
currency control mechanisms, it is necessary to present the
following:
a. Definitions
Serializability : If the reads and writes
for each transaction among sequences of transactions are
contiguous, such a log is called serial. This serial
sequence of transactions preserves consistency since each
transaction is executed alone. Serializability has been
adopted almost universally as the correct criterion for DBMS
concurrency control.
- Transaction failures : The concurrency con-
troller must also guarangee termination, and must operate
robustly and efficiently to maintain the integrity of DDBS
.
The failure in transaction is due to three problems:
— Deadlock, i.e., two or more processes might
be forced to wait for each other.
— Some process may be indefinitely postponed
by an unexpected conspiracy of events.
Cyclic restart, i.e., the transaction
repeated reaches a blocked state and is aborted and restarted
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Robustness : this means that the concurrency
controller must operate correctly despite the component
failures. There are three types of these component failures:
A failed site may hold information needed
to synchronize progress transactions.
A failed site may hold stored copies of
data items being updated by a transaction.
— A transaction that is updating data at
several sites may fail after performing some updates but
not all of them.
- Efficiency : the efficiency of a distributed
concurrency controller is determined principally by how much
intersite communication it requires.
b. Types of Mechanisms
In this section the discussion will be on three
concurrency control mechanisms which satisfy the following
criteria: serializability , robustness, and efficiency.
(1) Distributed locking mechanisms .
(a) Local (central) locking. This mechanism
is the most widely used in concurrency control. Locking
synchronizes transactions by explicitly detecting and prevent-
ing conflicts at local levels when transaction issues a READ
or WRITE command. The DBMS attempts to "set a lock" on the
desired data item; the lock is "granted" only if no other
transaction holds a conflicting lock. If the lock is not
granted, the requesting transaction waits until the lock is
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available and can be granted. DBMS is responsible to
generate lock requests for each transaction issued at the
local node. Since transactions are made to wait for locks,
the possibility of deadlock exists (see Figure 3).
By using a deadlock graph in the DBMS,
deadlocks can be detected. There is a deadlock in the system
if, and only if, the deadlock graph has a cycle (see
Figure 4 ) . If a deadlock exists some transaction in the
cycle is backed out and restarted, but this may lead to
cyclic restart. A simple way of avoiding this problem is
to always abort the "youngest" transaction involved in the
deadlock. Indefinite postponement can be prevented in a
locking mechanism by processing lock requests on a first-
come, first-served basis.
(b) Global locking. One site (node) of
DDBMS may be designated a "primary site." It manages all
synchronization for the whole system. When a transaction
needs to access data at any node, a lock is requested from
the primary site. Although locks are centralized at the
primary site, the database is, of course, distributed.
Once a transaction is granted a lock it may access data at
whatever site has a copy. To maintain the data integrity
in the case of updating data items that have many stored
copies, all copies must be updated before the lock is
released. Otherwise, another transaction can read a copy
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The principal drawback of primary site
locking is that the primary site tends to be a bottleneck.
The capacity of the primary site to process locks binds
the capacity of the entire distributed system.
(c) Redundant primary locking. If for
each logical data item there is a copy in each site, there
will be no single site that is primary in any sense. This
approach is called primary copy locking. It eliminates
the primary site bottleneck, but this mechanism introduces
a new problem of deadlock detection. The solution is to
designate one site of the DDBMS as the "deadlock detector."
Periodically each other site sends it a list of newly
granted or released locks, and newly pending requests. The
deadlock detector then operates as in the Local Locking
case. To maintain the integrity of database, if a trans-
action is written into a data item, all copies must be
updated before the lock is released.
(2) Conflict-Driven Restart Mechanism . This
mechanism is used as a model of transaction execution in
which each transaction is active at only one site at a time
It moves from site to site during its execution. When a
transaction wants to access a data item, a site must test
whether it conflicts with a previous access made by an
in-progress transaction. If it does conflict, one of three
actions is possible: it waits, it is restarted, or another
transaction is restarted. If the system responds to
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conflict by making the requesting transaction wait, deadlock
is possible. To avoid deadlock, Rosenkrantz, et . al.
[Ref. 24] proposed two mechanisms that substitute restarts
for waiting. Both mechanisms require that transactions be
assigned unique "timestamps" when they are submitted.
Intuitively, timestamps correspond to the time a transaction
was submitted. They have two important properties:
timestamps assigned at different sites must be different,
and timestamps are used to resolve conflicts such as the
following. In one mechanism, called the Wait-Die System,
the requesting transaction waits if it has a smaller time-
stamp (i.e., is older), or else it is restarted. In the
second mechanism, called the Wound-Wait System, the
requesting transaction waits if it has a larger timestamp
(i.e., is younger), or else the transaction is restarted.
(3) Majority Consensus Mechanism . This is one
of the first distributed concurrency control mechanisms
proposed by Thomas [Ref. 25]. The majority concensus
algorithm assumes a fully redundant database. A transaction
executes at one site. The READ command accesses stored
data at its site and does so without locking or any other
synchronization. Whenever the transaction issues a WRITE
command, the name of the data item being updated and its new
value are recorded in an update list. The database itself
is not modified at this time. When the transaction is
completed, the update list is sent to all sites and each
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site "votes" on it. If a majority of the sites vote, "Yes,"
the transaction is accepted and the updates are installed at
all sites; otherwise the transaction is restarted. The
origin of the algorithm is the rule that determines how each
site votes. A site votes, "Yes," on transaction T if:
The data items read by T have not been
modified since T read them (the algorithm requires that a
data item must be read before it can be written)
.
T does not conflict with any transaction
T' that is pending at the site (T' is pending if the site
has voted, "Yes," but T T has not yet been accepted or
rejected systemwide).
In order to meet condition (1), the algorithm
uses a timestamping technique. Transactions are assigned
timestamps as in "Conflict Driven Start" and each stored
data item is tagged with the timestamp of the most recent
transaction that has updated it. Also, update lists are
augmented to include the name of each data item read by the
transaction and its timestamp. When a site receives an
update list it can compare timestamps to determine whether
Condition (1) holds. Since augmented updated lists specify
transaction READ-sets and WRITE-sets, Condition (2) is
easily checked as well.
If Condition (1) is not satisfied, the site
"votes" the transaction and it is restarted. If (1) is
satisfied but (2) is not, the site cannot vote on this
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transaction until the pending one is resolved. Since
different sites receive update lists in different orders,
they vote in different orders and deadlock could result. To
avoid deadlock, the sites votes, "No," if (1) holds, (2) does
not hold, and the transaction has a larger timestamp (i.e.,
is younger) than the pending one. If a majority of sites
vote, "No," the transaction is restarted.
The voting rules ensure that two conflict-
ing transactions are both accepted only if one has read the
other's output. Since both transactions received a majority
of "Yes" votes, some site, say S, must have voted "Yes" on
both transactions. Since they conflict, S must have
installed one before voting on the other. This guarantees
that the second read the first one's output; otherwise S
would not have voted, "Yes." This is sufficient to guarantee




1. Distributed Loop Data Base System (DLDBS)
Another strategy for communication is the DDLCN
approach which was proposed by Liu [Ref. 26]. The approach
is simple to implement; also it is robust with respect to
failures of communication links and hosts. Moreover, the
approach has good performance (high throughput and low
delay). Discussion of the reliability of such an approach
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in site crash will follow the definition and the implemen-
tations issues of DDLCN.
a. Definition
DDLCN is designed as a fault-tolerant distributed
system that midi , mini, and micro computes through careful
integration of hardware, software, and communication.
b. Implementation
DDLCN is a local network using a loop topology.
It has two communication loops to transmit messages in
opposite directions. Each host is connected to the network
by a microprocessor-based loop interface unit (LIU) which
has its own RAM, ROM and sufficient computer power to work
as a front-end processor for the host. The LIU design is
unique in that it incorporates tri-state control logic,
thereby enabling the network to become fault-tolerant in
instances of link failures by dynamically reconfigurating
the logical direction of message flow. In designing distri-
buted loop data base systems (DLDDBS) for DDLCN two types of
nodes should be considered [Ref. 27]:
(1) Loop Request Nodes (LRNS) . This is where
users can make requests to DDB.
(2) Loop Data Nodes (LDNS) These contain the
physical data and the DBMS needed to satisfy the requests.
It is assumed that when a user tries to access
DLDBS by sending a transaction, a user process is created
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in an LDN. After some integrity checking is done and the
transaction is considered valid, the user process send this
transaction (in case of an update transaction) to LDCS.
c. Operation of the Algorithm
Briefly the algorithm is assumed working on
types of communication subsystems which have reliable end-
to-end protocols. In normal cases (no site crashes or link
failures), the protocols in the communication subsystem can
guarantee that: (1) a transaction message will eventually
be delivered to all destinations, and (2) transaction
messages from a node are delivered in the order in which
they were sent.
The distributed software residing at each LDN
to enforce mutual consistency among database copies is
called the consistency enforcer. It is a component of the
inter-database control software. Each DBMS at LDN has its
own processes to handle local concurrency control when
local transactions are executed concurrently. It is
assumed that distributed transaction processing is initiated
by user processes, each of which is local to one of the LDNS
.
User processes may be either processes representing some
remote on-line users or processes on behalf of application
programs
.
In abnormal cases (site crashes and communication




The system will continue operating in spite
of site crashes and communication link failures.
A transaction message is put in execution
waiting a cue EWB of either every site or no site.
If a transaction message is put into EWB,
it will be dispatched and executed to completion sooner or
later; all transactions are eventually dispatched in a
total ordering according to their priority.
d. DDB Integrity Using DLDBS
(1) Communication Link Failures . The algorithm
requires that each node has (direct and indirect) paths to
every other node. Therefore, as long as no site is partition-
ed from the network communication, link failures do not
create any difficulty to the algorithms. When the network
becomes partitioned, the partition which has a majority of
nodes in the network still can continue operating and it
treats the nodes in the other partition the same as crashed
sites. Only one partition is allowed to operate; otherwise,
inconsistency among DDB in different partitions may occur.
Using the recovery technique for site crashes, the network
can return to a consistent state after the partitions are
repaired. However DDLCN network partition is rare due to
the tri-state control mechanism built into the interface.
(2) Site Crashes . The algorithm can continue
operating in the case of one or more site crashes. The DDB
will recover from anomalies and lead to a consistent state
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when a crashed node has been repaired. Without going into
further detail, the algorithm in this case needs "a reliable
broadcast" facility [Ref. 28] which guarantees that a
broadcast message will reach either every destination or
no destination when the sender crashes during the broad-
casting. Moreover, the algorithm needs a recovery algorithm
to facilitate the withdrawal of a crashed site from the
whole site.
2. Distributed Semaphore Method
Distributed semaphore is another approach of communi-
cation strategy for ensuring the consistency of a multiple
copy database. Discussion in this section involves the
definition of distributed semaphore, implementation issues,




A distributed semaphore is designed so that for
every P operation that is completed by a process, an associated
V operation has been performed [Ref. 291 . This type of
semaphore was originally developed to facilitate the solution
of synchronization problems in distributed systems.
b. Implementation
Implementation of distributed semaphore according





Broadcast Assumption. If a site broadcasts
a message that message will be received by every other site.
Message Order. All messages that originate
at a given site are received by other sites in the order in
which they were broadcast.
Timestamp. A timestamp is associated with
each message m and it is assumed that the timestamps are
consistent with causality. In other words, timestamp of V is
less than the timestamp of Vp if V, can affect Vp
.
A Message Queue. For each distributed
semaphore implemented, a message queue is maintained. At
each site this queue will contain the received messages
arranged in ascending order by timestamp.
Acknowledged Message. When a message is
received at a site an acknowledgement message is sent to all
other sites.
A Fully Acknowledge Message. This message
is sent by the originating site when the message has been
received by every site in the system.
- V# (ds.,x). The identification number of
"V semaphore ds . " messages with a timestamp is less than or
equal to time ' x'
.





P and V operations in distributed semaphore
are implemented as follows:
V(ds.) Broadcast message "V semaphore ds .
"
P(ds.) Broadcast message "P semaphroe ds .
Let tc denote the timestamp on this message.
Then wait until any message m f concerning ds
.
is received and fully acknowledged
V#(ds., ts(m')) > P#(ds.,tc).
It is not necessary to store the entire message queue for
each semaphore at every site. Instead, the relevant informa-
tion from the message queue can be coded in a few integer
variables. Due to the message m' order assumption, after a
message m is fully acknowledged at site L, no message m T where
ts(m ? ) < ts(m) will be received at L. Furthermore, the
implementation of distributed semaphores outlined above
requires only V#(ds.,x) and P#(ds.,tc) [Ref. 311-
The initial portion of the message queue can be stored
in two integer variables: P# and V# . As messages are
received, they are put in a bound message queue. The
capacity of that queue need not exceed the number of sites
in the system. P# and V# are updated by increments of one
and then the message is deleted.
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c. Operation of the Method
In the situation where there are multiple copies
of some of the entities in the database, i.e., partially or
fully redundant distributed database, all copies should have
the same change when any transaction updates one of these
copies. The transaction need only deal with one copy of the
database in order to update the other's copies. Thus the
transaction has to broadcast to all these sites a timestamped
message containing the entry and its new value. Upon receipt
of such messages, a site must broadcast an acknowledgement
message to all other sites. The update on the database at
site M may not be executed until site M receives a fully
acknowledged message from the other sites. This is because
prior to that time other messages may be.received which carry
updates to the semaphore for the database. Since the message
order holds for all messages, then both the update and distri-
buted semaphore messages will use the same communication
network. This implies that when a transaction is executed,
the local copy for every node has its own value. This is
because prior to accessing an entity, a P operator on a sema-
phore associated with that entity is perfomed resulting in the
broadcast of a message that must be fully acknowledged for
the P to complete. This serves to "flush" all update
messages to that site from the communication network.
d. DDB Integrity Using Distributed Semaphore Method
This type of communication strategy is well
suited to maintain the integrity of distributed database
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(fully or partially redundant) by putting all the sites in
full communication with each other. However this impact
of distributed semaphore needs to be developed more fully
in order to avoid the problem of site crashes, since a full
acknowledgement requires the participation of all the sites
One characteristic of this strategy is that it can






Maintaining the distributed database integrity is not a
trivial problem. Much progress still needs to be made in
several areas, especially regarding link failures, dead-
locking, and integrity constraint monitoring.
We have presented several approaches to preserve the
integrity of a distributed database, and the obvious
question is, "Which one is the best method?" or, "How many
of these approaches need to be considered in one system?"
There are no clear answers to such questions since each
system has its own characteristics and environment.
However, integrity of the database system has to be
provided at many levels. The initial concerns regarding
integrity must start at the design level, which has to use
the preservation of data integrity as one of the design
objectives; followed by the management and operations levels,
which must allocate resources to large numbers of users and
resolve their process conflicts; and then followed in the
communication systems, which have to manage multiway message
traffic between nodes.
A strategy of regular monitoring of a database is essential
during the maintenance phase. Monitoring is possible on two
levels: internal monitoring which can be carried out by
DBMS, and external monitoring which can be carried out by
the user. The latter requires the user to provide assertions
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regarding data relationships. Finally, more research in
this area is still needed especially regarding time
consistency, reconstruction of consistent global states in
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SOFTWARE ERRORS IN REAL-TIME SOFTWARE
Software errors and their frequency of occurrence
in real-time software. The types of errors can be grouped
into the following major classes:
1. Computation errors: errors in or resulting from
coded equations, equations that
produced values directly from
the physical problem being
solved, and equations used in
bookkeeping sense. Typical
errors are mathematical model-
ing, index, conversion, and
mixed-mode arithmetic.
2. Logic errors: incorrect logic code, missing
condition test, flag not
tested, etc.
3. Data input errors: format errors , input read from
incorect data file, invalid
input read from correct data
file, etc.
4. Data output errors: format errors, data written on












missing output, output field
size too small, etc.
errors made in reading, writ-




interface errors, wrong routine
called, and incompatibilities
between database and using
routines, etc.
errors in specification of
global variables and constants,
data not properly defined/
dimensioned, etc.
data not initialized, initiali-
zed to wrong values, incorrect
data units, etc.
9. Documentation





10. Operation errors: wrong database used, wrong tapes
used, configuration, control
errors, etc.





MODEL FOR DECENTRALIZED AUTHORIZATION
This model is based on the one defined in Reference 32
and adapted to handle the decentralization of administration.
The named items in the database are called database object
types . We make the distinction between object type (or
category) and instances (occurrences) of an object. A data
class , D, is a set of database object occurrences. A sub -
class , Dl, is a subset of the object occurrences of a data
class, and can be defined in terms of the class D and an
arbitrary predicate P:
Dl = D : P
Generally, we refer to data classes and subclasses as
"classes." Classes are the units of delegation of adminis-
tration and can either be disjoint (no common occurrences)
or overlapping. (This is in general, later we will only
allow subclasses to be overlapping.) The structuring of
classes can be described by a class structure graph , CSG,
where nodes represent classes and a directed arc from node
i to node j indicates that class j is a member of class i.
The CSG is always a tree.
Security policies are represented by authorization rules .
An authorization rule is the tuple (s,0,t,p,f), which specifies
that subject s has authorization of type t to those
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occurrences of object type for which predicate p is true.
In general, user s cangrantthe access right defined by 0,t,
and p if the copy flag f is true. The combination of (0,t,p)
of a rule is called an authorization right .
For this environment, there are two types of rules.
Access rules which are rules controlling database access,
where s is a user; is a database object type; t is an access
type such as READ, DELETE, or UPDATE; p can depend on data-
base values or system variables; and f will be false since
only administrators are able to delegate their rights.
The second type of authorization rule is the adminis -
trative rule , where s is a DBA identifier, is a data class,
t an administrative access type, p is always true, and f can
be true or false depending on the administrator being authori-
zed to delegate this right or not.
Administrative rights refer to the ability to control
the database access actions, as opposed to the ability to
access the database (some examples of administrative access
types are shown in Figure 1). As we are mainly interested
in administration aspects we will write administrative rules
as (s, 0,t,f) for simplicity.
DBA's delegate administrative rights by means of
commands, expressed in some suitable syntax. From these
commands in the system extracts an administrative request ,
which is a tuple (s 1 , P T , t' , f), where s' is the DBA
entering the command, 0' is the object of the command to
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which administrative access of type t' applies, and f T
indicates if the access right of s is being delegated. A
similar tuple is extracted by the system when a user




Validation of an administrative request (or an access
request) implies finding a rule where s, and t match the
corresponding parts of the request, and f=true if f'=true.
If such a rule is not found the request is not accepted
and an enforcement procedures, such as logging the illegal
request, is invoked.
It is useful in some situations (for example, when
different DBA's administer classes containing common objects)
to have a context or environment for the requests issued by
the users of the system. In our case a useful context is
provided by data classes, i.e., users make requests in the
context of a class. An access rule becomes now (s ,0,t ,p ,f ,D)
,
where D indicates the context (D is a data class name).
MECHANISM FOR AUTHORIZATION
Using the model discussed above we now propose a mechanism
to implement these concepts. For concreteness we assume a
2
multilevel relational database system where the conceptual
schema is composed of base relations . The allowed access
types are assumed to be READ, DELETE, UPDATE and INSERT.
Classes are restricted to be sets of relations . A basic
class is a set of base relations . For example, suppose




If R1,R2,R3 are base relations then Dl is a basic class.
A subclass D2 of Dl is defined as
D2 = (Rl f ,R2' ,. . .RN;)
where the relations Rl ' to RN f are projections, restrictions
and joins of the base relations. As an example consider a
simplified banking database containing account and customer
information. Assuming joint accounts are allowed the data-
base might contain the following three base relations:
Rl: (ACCOUNT §, BRANCH #, ACCOUNT_DETAIL)
R2: (ACCOUNT #, CUST #)
R3: (CUST #, CUST_DETAIL)
Subclasses containing information relevant to each bank
branch may then be defined. For example the subclass for
branch Bl would contain the following three relations (informal-
ly defined)
Rl' = (Rl: WHERE BRANCH § * Bl)
R2' = (R2: WHERE ACCOUNT § = Rl' . ACCOUNT #)
R3 r = (R3: WHERE CUST # = R2 .CUST #)
Administrative responsibility for these subclasses
would then be delegated to DBA's in the local branches.
Notice that in general subclasses are not disjoint, i.e., a
a customer may have accounts in different branches.
Administrative access types which apply to a basic
class D are listed in Figure 1. The set of types al - a6 are




right to create, delete and modify
objects in D;
right to redefine and delete D;
right to authorize READ access to
objects in D;
right to authorize DELETE access to
objects in D;
right to authorize UPDATE access to
objects in D;
right to authorize INSERT access to
objects in D;





given by the system to the definer of a new basic class.
The type a7 is given by the system to a delegator only after
the class has been delegated. The same types with the excep-
tion of al can apply to a subclass and are jointly known as
A„. Access type al includes among others, the ability to
redefine a base relation (for example by adding a new column),
delete a base relation from the conceptual schema and define
semantic integrity constraints for a base relation.
As different DBA's can administer different basic
classes and as the administration of a basic class is associa-
ted with the ability to redefine the underlying data object
types, basic classes must be disjoint (i.e., they must possess
no common objects) in order to avoid conflicts. In contrast,
subclasses can be overlapping because no object types can
be created, deleted, or redefined through subclass .rights
.
Class administrators may delegate some or all of
their rights to other DBA's if the corresponding delegation
flag is true. When they define a subclass, say Dl, from a
class D, they obtain for Dl the same set of administrative
rights that they had for D . The DBA's also authorize user
access to objects within a class (such as attributes), or
to application views which are constructed using relational
operators on the relation comprising the class. In a multi-
level system, access rules pertaining to a view should be
consistent with the access rules for the underlying objects.
We consider that the conceptual level for DBA's consists of
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the set of base relations comprising the classes which
they administer.
We restrict the administration of a class to a single
DBA and allow a class to be delegated only once. This avoids
the situation where an administrator receives rights to a
class from more than one delegator. Revocation is therefore
simplified and time stamping is not required.
If a DBA delegates the administration of a class then
any access rules that had been authorized in the class
previous to the delegation become the responsibility of the
delegatee.
As administration and database access are separate
functions, a reorganization of the administration function
should not mean that some users of the system can no longer
access the database. Only administrative rights are recalled
when a delegated class is therefore recalled. Access rules
authorized by the DBA's whose administrative rights were
recalled are not deleted but become the responsibility of
the recalling DBA. The recalling DBA can then review the
acquired rules and delete or modify them on an individual
basis.
A simple example illustrates the principles of authori-
zation and revocation. Figure 2 shows a sequence of author-
zations (dl,d2 , . . ,d5) with each arc representing a delegation
or authorization and each node a set of authorization rules.














(DBA4, D4, a3, false)
d5
READ
(Ul, VI, DELETE, p7 false, D2)
UPDATE
INSERT
(U2, 01, READ, p, false, D4)
Figure 2
AUTHORIZATION GRAPH BEFORE RECALL
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(It is used for illustration purposes only and need not be
stored explicitly in the system.)
We assume DBA1 is authorized to define relations and
hence basic classes. Initially DBA1 has the set of adminis-
tration rights, A„, for the basic class Dl. Classes D2 and D3
are defined by DBA1 as subclasses of Dl and are delegated to
DBA2 and DBA3 respectively (dl and d2). Both DBA ' s are given
the set of administrative rights, A„, associated with a sub-
class, but only DBA2 may further delegate these rights. DBA2
defines D4 as a subclass of D2 and delegates the right to
authorize read access to objects in D4 to DBA4 (d3). DBA2
also defines an application view VI which is a relation con-
structed from the objects in class D2 and authorizes user Ul
to have all access rights to it (d4). DBA4 grants U2 read
access to object 01 in class D4 (d5). The associated class
structure graph is shown in Figure 3« IF DBA1 recalls all
delegated rights for D2 then the class structure subgraph
for D2 is traversed and all administrative rules associated
with the nodes of the tree are revoked from the relevant
DBAs and given to DBA1. The situation after revocation is
shown in Figure 4 and is logically equivalent to DBA1
having authorized all the access rules. Notice users Ul and




















AUTHORIZATION GRAPH AFTER RECALL OF CLASS D
95

ALGORITHMS FOR DELEGATION AND RECALL
In this section we present high-level algorithms for
delegation and revocation. Other necessary algorithms, such
as those for defining classes and authorizing access are
straightforward and have therefore not been included. We
assume that the control information is a set of relations.
In particular, authorization rules are contained in the
relation AUTH defined as
AUTH (s,0,t,f)
,
where the column names are as previously defined and the under-
lines indicate the identifier of the tuples. Only adminis-
tration rules are used by the algorithms described in this
section. The following algorithms are written in a pseduo
ALGOL and describe procedures which are invoked by some





indicates a selection of tuples based on the criteria
specified in brackets, followed by a projection onto col_name_l
For example,
AUTH.t [s=s* , 0=0']
selects those tuples in relation AUTH for which the subject
is s' and the object is f and then projects out their
access types. Tuples are explicitly inserted and deleted.
For example the following statement inserts a tuple (s ! ,
0'
, t T , f f ) into AUTH:
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insert (s — s T , ~ O f , t— t 1 , f — f 1 ) into AUTH
The statement
:
delete AUTH [ s=s
'
, 0=0 T ]
deletes the set of tuples from AUTH that have subject s'
and object '
.
We consider first the procedure CHECK_RIGHTS which is
invoked by all the subsequently defined procedures before
any access to the data control relations is allowed.
CHECK_RIGHTS (s f ,0' ,A' ,f) procedure
(This procedure checks that the subject s f has the set of
administrative access types A' for object 0'. If the boolean
variable f ' is true the delegation flag must also be true











If the set of access types A' is to be delegated, the
flag f must be true for all the rights in A'. If any of
the checked rules is not found, a system-defined enforcement
procedure (ENFORCEMENT) is invoked which, for instance,
may notify a security operator of the illegal access.
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DELEG_WITH_RECALL is the procedure used for delegating
administrative rights for a class from one administrator to
another while retaining the right to recall these rights.
DELEG_WTTH_RECALL (s 1 , s tT , D» , A_F) procedure
(This procedure is invoked when administrator s ? delegates
rights for class D f to administrator s ,T . A_F is a set of
ordered pairs a,f supplied by the administrator s f ,
which represent the set of access type, delegation flag
pairs delegated.)
begin
call CHECK_RIGHTS (s' ,D' , A_F. a, true);
for all pairs a. , f . A F
^ i' 1 —
begin
insert (s — s*' ,0 —D' , t — a. , f — f .
)
'
' 1 ' i
insert AUTH:
end
The CHECK_RIGHTS procedure is invoked to validate that
the delegator does have the administrative rights being
delegated and that the delegation flag is true for each of
them. The delegated rights for class D' are then inserted
into AUTH on behalf of the delegatee. All the delegator r s
rights to class D' are deleted. Finally the delegator is
given the right to recall the delegated administrative




The delegation policy allows an administrator to delegate
the rights for a class to only one administrator. If it is
desirable to have multiple administrators for some set of
objects, overlapping classes must be defined and separately
delegated. This avoids the situation where an administrator
receives administrative access to a class from two different
delegators. Although the existing access rules associated
with the objects in class D T are now logically the responsi-
bility of the delegatee, no physical alteration of the rules
is necessary.
Upon recall of a class the administrative rights that
were initially delegated for that class are restored to the
delegator and removed from the delegatee. However, there
may now be a number of delegatees from whom administrative
rights must be removed. This is because the initial delegatee
may also have delegated the class. Furthermore, it is not
sufficient just to remove all administrative rules from AUTH
which are associated with the recalled class because sub-
classes may have also been defined. Thus, the CSG for the
delegated class, which we assume is a by-product of the
procedure for class definition must be examined and the
administrative rules associated with each class corresponding
to a node in the tree must be deleted. The recall procedure
is defined as follows:
RECALL (s 1 ,D') procedure
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(This procedure is invoked when s T recalls all delegated
administrative rights for class D'. SAVE_ACC is a variable





call CHECK_RIGHTS (s' ,D T ,a7, false);
call PROP_DOWN (D 1 );
for all a. SAVE_ACC insert
(s — s' ,0 — D' ,t — a., f — true)
into AUTH:
delete AUTH [s=s f ,0=D' ,t=a7];
end
The procedure PR0P_D0WN is defined as:
PR0P_D0WN (D) procedure
(SAVE is a function which inserts access rights into the
variable SAVE_ACC. CHILD is a function which provides the




for all D. CHILD (D) call PROP DOWN (D.);
1 — 1
end
CHECK_RIGHTS validates that s T has recall rights for
class D f . The PR0P_D0WN procedures is used by RECALL to
delete the administration rules associated with the classes
specified in the call parameter. The function CHILD(D')
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provides the subclasses which are the immediate children of
class D T . This function is used recursively to identify all
the nodes of the CSG for D'. Before deleting the rules for
the subclasses of D' the access types are saved by the function
SAVE into the set SAVE_ACC . The recall procedure then
restores the administrative rights of s* for class D T using
the administrative access types stored in SAVE_ACC . Finally
the right for s' to recall class D' is deleted. Notice that
since the access rules (indicating regular database access)
do not indicate who is the administrator that wrote them,





Recovery of the database when the basic configuration is
dumping plus logging can employ a number of recovery methods.
Which particular method will depend on the particular
recovery situation and the recovery points provided. Recovery
must take place to a consistent state of the relevant part
of the database. The recovery points may be of two types:
transaction recovery points which lie either on transaction
or integrity unit boundaries; and system recovery points,
which are checkpoints. Therefore there are two general
types of recovery. Forward recovery is used where physical
damage has occurred to the storage media. The other type of
recovery is backward recovery which may be divided into off-
line backward recovery and quick (or dynamic) backward
recovery. In either of these cases the storage media are
not damaged; what is desired is to reverse the changes made
by partially completed transactions.
For all methods of recovery in a transaction oriented
environment, it is advisable that the log records transactions




on restart as users may be unsure of which transactions
completed successfully. The integrity of the database is
maintained by the system but it may be destroyed by the terminal
operator. The terminal operator may assume that processing
of a previous transaction has completed successfully when it
has not and he therefore does not re-input the corresponding
input data. Similarly, assumption of non-completion of a
transaction that has completed successfully leads to retrans-
mission of the input data and double updating of records.
1. Roll Forward
In this method of recovery the procedure is the
following:
(i) Restore the database or a particular area of
the database from a dump copy,
(ii) Align the log file containing after images to
a system recovery point (checkpoint) corres-
ponding to the restored state of the database,
(iii) Apply after images until a nominated system
recovery point is reached. This would normally
be the last checkpoint before failure,
(iv) Restart processing of transactions from the
nominated recovery point by receiving terminal
inputs
.
A search is made of the log file between the last checkpoint
and the point of failure and only those transactions on the
log file which do not have a corresponding end of transaction
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indicator transmit output messages. The transactions which
did complete successfully are rerun but message output is
suppressed.
If an orderly termination of processing was not possible
due to the type of failure, then it may be necessary before
restarting to write an end-of-file (EOF) manually on the log
file.
If duplicate output messages are to be suppressed,
then stage 1), ii) and iii) are as before followed by:
(iv) Search log file betwen last checkpoint and
failure.
(v) Reprocess all transactions on log but suppress
output messages for completed transactions,
(vi) Restart processing of input from terminals.
2. Roll-Forward With Roll-Back
The procedure for this method is the following:
(i) Restore the database or a particular area of
the database for the dump copy,
(ii) Align the log file containing after images to
a system recovery point (checkpoint) corres-
ponding to the resorted state of the database,
(iii) Apply after images until the end of the log.
Civ) Apply before images back to the last system
recovery point in order to achieve a consistent




The procedure is the following:
(i) Restore the database or a particular area of
the database for the dump copy,
(ii) Align the log, which only contains trans-
actions records, to a point corresponding to
the restored state of the database,
(iii) Reprocess all transactions until the end of
the log file,
(iv) Restart processing of terminal input.
If end of transaction indicators are written on the log file,
then output messages for those transactions can be suppressed
so as to prevent output message duplication. Enquiry only
transactions may be ignored if so chosen as these have no
affect on the database.
Roll-forward, roll forward with roll-back and re-run are
examples of forward recovery whereas the following method is
a method of backward-recovery.
4. Roll-Back
The procedure is the following:
(i) Apply before images back to either:
(a) start of the failed command
(b) start of an integrity unit
(c) start of transaction
(d) system recovery point (checkpoint)
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(ii) The log file is realigned to a point corres-
ponding to the roll-back,
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